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Constitutional Law-DUE PROCESS-HORSE TRAINER HELD
STRICTLY LIABLE FOR THE CONDITION OF HORSES-Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1978).
On August 18, 1974, an investigator of the Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering and a security officer of Calder Race Course,
Dade County, Florida, searched the barn area and tack room as-
signed to W. F. Caple. The searchers discovered three hypodermic
needles and syringes containing a vitamin substance in an un-
locked cabinet.1 As a result of the discovery, Caple was charged
with violation of rules 7E-1.06(15) and (16) of the Florida Adminis-
trative Code (rules (15) and (16)).2
The stewards of Calder Race Course conducted a formal hearing
on August 21, 1974, concerning the charges. On the basis of their
findings, the stewards suspended Caple's license for a period of
sixty days during which time he was denied privilege of the
grounds and was unable to enter in a race any horse in which he
owned an interest.4 The next day Caple obtained a temporary in-
junction staying the enforcement of his suspension.'
Caple appealed the ruling of the stewards to the Director of the
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering and then to the Board of Busi-
1. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Fla. 1978). See
generally Brown v. Waldman, 177 A.2d 179, 181 (R.I. 1962), where Vitamin B was held to be
a drug.
2. 362 So. 2d at 1352. The rules provide:
(15) No person within the grounds of a racing association where race horses are
lodged or kept, shall have in or upon the premises which he occupies or has the
right to occupy, or in his personal property or effects, any prohibited drugs, or any
hypodermic syringe, hypodermic needle, or other device which could be used for
the injection or other infusion into a horse of a drug, stimulant or narcotic,
without first securing written permission from the stewards. Every racing associa-
tion, upon the grounds of which race horses are lodged or kept, is required to use
all reasonable efforts to prevent the violation of this rule.
(16) All medicines, drugs, or medications of any nature shall be kept or stored
at all times in a securely locked cabinet, locker, or room. It is the responsibility of
the trainer to see that this rule is complied with. Any trainer or other person
found guilty of the violation of this rule shall be fined or suspended, or both.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 7E-1.06(15)-(16). Most jurisdictions impose a punishment on the
trainer only after a horse is actually drugged. See, e.g., Jamison v. State Racing Comm'n,
507 P.2d 426, 427-28 (N.M. 1973); O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529,
530 n.2 (Ohio 1974); State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d 263
(W. Va. 1949). Rules (15) and (16), however, impose liability on the trainer for the mere
possession of the drugs in question. Both types of regulations are directed at minimizing the
possibility of a racehorse being illegally drugged.
3. Stewards are officials who manage the affairs of race tracks. THE RANDOM Housa Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1395 (J. Stein ed. 1966).
4. 362 So. 2d at 1352.
5. Id.
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ness Regulation. Both the Director and the Board held hearings
and affirmed the ruling of the stewards. Having exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies, Caple petitioned the Third District Court of
Appeal for certiorari, but his petition was denied.
The Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering then filed a motion in cir-
cuit court to dissolve the temporary injunction. Caple responded
with a motion for entry of a permanent injunction.8 On July 26,
1976, the circuit court granted Caple's motion and declared rules
(15) and (16) unconstitutional" on the authority of State ex rel.
Paoli v. Baldwin.10 On appeal, the district court upheld the trial
judge's ruling, but certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida as a question of great public concern.11 In Division of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, the Florida Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether a horse trainer is an absolute insurer under
rules (15) and (16).12 The Florida Supreme Court accepted juris-
diction of the issue. s Overruling its earlier decision in Baldwin,
the court quashed the district court's finding of unconstitutionality
and remanded the case with instructions to dissolve the permanent
injunction.' 4 The court concluded that rules (15) and (16) were
reasonable and constitutional because the rules promoted the legit-
imate government goal of preventing the illegal drugging of
horses.' 5
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that although strict
liability is imposed on horse trainers, this absolute standard is ap-
propriate in light of the activity involved and the procedural pro-
tections provided for the trainer. As part of this analysis, this note
6. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d 1350
(Fla. 1978).
7. Caple v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 321 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
8. 362 So. 2d at 1352.
9. Id.
10. 31 So. 2d 627, rev'd on rehearing, 31 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1947).
11. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 350 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977), quashed and remanded, 362 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1978).
12. Id. at 489. No proof of negligence or carelessness on the trainer's part was needed to
support his suspension. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 7E-1.06(16). Strict liability is the essence of an
absolute insurer rule. See Isaacs v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
13. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) provides: "The supreme court . . . [mlay review by
certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal ... that passes upon a question certified
by a district court of appeal to be of great public interest .... " The district court had
certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court because of changes in the Code and the
lapse of time since the Baldwin decision. 350 So. 2d at 489.
14. 362 So. 2d at 1356.
15. Id. at 1354-55.
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will examine the Baldwin precedent and compare it to the laws of
other states.
Florida law before Caple concerning absolute insurer rules for
horse trainers is slight. The Florida legislature created a State Rac-
ing Commission in 1931.10 This enactment began the state regula-
tion of the horse racing industry. The Racing Commission pro-
ceeded to construct and adopt the Rules of Horse Racing in 1942.17
These included absolute insurer rules 109 and 117 which were de-
clared unconstitutional in 1947 by the Baldwin court.
In Baldwin, the State Racing Commission' s suspended a trainer
when it was discovered that a urine sample from his horse con-
tained traces of benzedrine. 19 The trainer was suspended even
though he presented evidence that the horse had been drugged by
a stableboy. On appeal, the trainer attacked rules 109 and 117 of
the Rules of Horse Racing.20 These rules made a horse trainer an
absolute insurer of the horses entered in a race. The trainer argued
16. Ch. 31-14832, 1931 Fla. Laws 679 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 550.02(3) (1979)).
The powers and duties of the racing commission were described in Ch. 35-17276, § 2, 1935
Fla. Laws 1179, which provided:
To make rules and regulations for the control, supervision and direction of ap-
plicants, permittees, and licensees, and for the holding, conducting, and operating
of all race tracks, race meets and/or races held in this State, provided such rules
and regulations shall be uniform in their application and effect, and the duty of
exercising this control and power is hereby made mandatory upon such
Commission.
These powers and duties have been expanded and are now under the auspices of the Divi-
sion of Pari-Mutuel Wagering of the Department of Business Regulation. See FLA. STAT. §
550.02 (1979).
17. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d at 629.
18. The State Racing Commission was a board created by the Florida Legislature to
manage the horse racing industry. Ch. 31-14832, 1931 Fla. Laws 679 (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 20.16 (1979)).
19. 31 So. 2d at 628.
20. Id. at 629. Rules 109 and 117 provided:
109 - No person shall administer, or permit to be administered in any manner
whatsoever, internally or externally, to any horse entered or to be entered in a
race, any stimulant, depressant, hypnotic or narcotic drug, of any kind or descrip-
tion, prior to a race or work-out.
117 - The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and responsible for the condi-
tion of the horses entered in a race, regardless of the acts of a third party. Should
the chemical or other analysis or saliva or urine samples or other tests prove posi-
tive, showing the presence of any narcotic, stimulant, chemical or drug of any kind
or description, the trainer of the horse may be suspended or ruled off, and in
addition, the foreman in charge of the horse, the groom and any other person
shown to have had the care or attendance of the horse may be suspended or ruled
off in the discretion of the Commission, and for a like second or subsequent find-
ing shall be ruled off.
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that the absolute insurer rules were "so capriciously arbitrary as to
be of no legal force and effect."'" The Baldwin court initially held
that a regulation which tended to promote or fulfill a lawful pur-
pose was not inherently arbitrary or unreasonable.22 On rehearing,
however, the court abandoned this holding and concluded that due
process does not permit an agency to revoke a license, the key to a
trainer's livelihood, without providing a hearing at which the
trainer may present legitimate defenses. 28 The Baldwin court re-
lied heavily on a Maryland case, Mahoney v. Byers,2" to decide
that the rules in question created an irrebutable presumption of
guilt in violation of the trainer's right to due process of law.2
Baldwin placed Florida in the minority of states that reject the
constitutionality of absolute insurer rules.2 6
21. Id. at 630.
22. Id. at 629. Justice Adams dissented claiming rules 109 and 117 stripped trainers of a
valuable property right without due process of law. Id. at 630.
23. Id. at 630-31.
24. 48 A.2d 600 (Md. 1946). In Mahoney, a drug present in the horse's urine was found
to be conclusive evidence that the trainer was guilty by the Racing Commission. Id. at 602.
The trainer filed for a writ of mandamus to compel the Comission to rescind its order and
restore the trainer to good standing. The lower court ordered the writ to issue and the ap-
pellate court affirmed. Id. at 602, 604. The court held that the irrebuttable presumption
destroyed the right to offer evidence to establish innocence and that it was arbitrary and
therefore void. Id. at 603.
25. 362 So. 2d at 1353. An irrebuttable presumption is a "conclusive presumption which
requires a finding of the presumed fact once the underlying evidence is introduced ...
Evidence tending to rebut it is not admissible." H. BLACK, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1067
(5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has noted that irrebuttable presumptions often infringe
on rights granted by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974).
26. 362 So. 2d at 1354. Illinois is the only state which continues to hold absolute insurer
rules unconstitutional, Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 247 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1969), while
many states accept the constitutionality of absolute insurer rules. See, e.g., Sandstrom v.
California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d 17 (Cal.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) (court
found that rules which make the trainer an absolute insurer of his horse's condition were
constitutional); Maryland Racing Comm'n v. McGee, 128 A.2d 419 (Md. 1957) (court found
there was substantial evidence to justify the findings of the Racing Commission and there-
fore it was not the court's role to substitute their judgment for the Commission; however, it
stated that there was no necessity to decide if the rule could be validly applied where the
trainer had taken every precaution); Dare v. State, 388 A.2d 984 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (court held that rules which hold the trainer absolutely responsible for the horse's
condition were constitutional); Jamison v. State Racing Comm'n, 507 P.2d 426 (N.M. 1973)
(court held that rules which hold the trainer strictly accountable for his horse's condition
were constitutional); O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974)
(court held that the insurer rule which imposes strict liability upon a trainer for his horse's
condition is constitutional); State ex rel. Spiker v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 63 S.E.2d
831 (W. Va. 1951) (court held that rules which make a trainer strictly liable for the horse's
condition and which mandated the return of the prize money won by a drugged horse were
constitutional).
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As a result of Baldwin, the Racing Commission had the burden
of proving negligence on the part of the trainer before it could sus-
pend a trainer's license or levy a fine. In 1968, the Racing Commis-
sion revised its regulations and once again adopted absolute in-
surer rules, despite the fact that such rules had been declared
unconstitutional 21 years before. 7 Relying on Baldwin, the circuit
court and the Third District Court of Appeal in the Caple case
declared rules (15) and (16) to be unconstitutional.2 8 But the fail-
ure of the Baldwin court to recognize the power of a state to im-
pose strict liability persuaded the Florida Supreme Court to con-
clude that an absolute insurer rule for horse trainers was
constitutional and, therefore, that the Baldwin holding was
improper."
The Caple court noted that the Baldwin decision treated a regu-
lation that imposed strict liability as facially unconstitutional even
though the United States Supreme Court had declared the concept
of strict liability to be constitutional over a quarter of a century
before Baldwin.a0 Strict liability is recognized as constitutional in
certain areas3a In one case, Justice Harlan noted that the states
retain the police power to protect the public health, morals, and
safety, as well as the general common good.3 2 Therefore, Florida
has the power to regulate the horse racing industry if such is nec-
essary for the public good. In another case, Justice Frankfurter
commented that Congress has preferred to place the hardships of
consumer protection upon those who have had the opportunity,
before entering a business, to familiarize themselves with the con-
ditions imposed on that business.3 Horse trainers have the oppor-
tunity, and are required, in obtaining a license, to familiarize
themselves with and to abide by the rules and regulations of their
27. These rules appear in the Florida Administrative Code today in the same form as
they did in 1971, which was the last time it was revised. See Introduction, FLA. ADMIN. CODE
R. 7E-1.
28. 362 So. 2d at 1356. In Wilkey v. Board of Business Regulation, 314 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), the court affirmed the revocation of Wilkey's license due to viola-
tions of rules (15) and (16). This decision was consistent with Baldwin because evidence
showed that Wilkey was personally responsible for the violations. 314 So. 2d at 19.
29. 362 So. 2d at 1353-54.
30. Id. at 1355. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter
Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
32. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907).
33. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943).
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profession." Consequently, the trainers are in a position to know
the regulations and are aware of the risks involved in the horse
racing industry. Accordingly, the trainers should bear the responsi-
bility of consumer protection instead of the innocent public.
For a better understanding of the rationale used by the Caple
court, it is helpful to examine how other courts have handled abso-
lute insurer rules. Many jurisdictions have upheld the use of strict
liability rules in the horse racing industry. The California Supreme
Court examined absolute insurer rules in Sandstrom v. California
Horse Racing Board3" and noted that the imposition of strict lia-
bility by statute or judicial decision did not automatically violate
the due process clauses of the federal or state constitutions. The
court considered Baldwin and distinguished it, noting that Bald-
win failed to recognize the power of the state to impose strict lia-
bility. 6 The Sandstrom court adopted the stance that strict liabil-
ity may be applied as long as the rule is reasonable.3 To determine
the reasonableness of the California regulations at issue, the court
examined the nature of the regulated activity. Due to the amount
of wagering involved, the California court found that the wagering
public deserved the protection afforded by holding horse trainers
strictly liable if a horse was found drugged.3 8
Like California, West Virginia holds a trainer strictly liable if a
horse is found drugged. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals used reasoning similar to that used in Sandstrom to conclude
that imposition of strict liability for illegal drugging was reasonable
in the horse racing business.3 9 Accordingly, the court held that the
absolute insurer rule promulgated by the Racing Commission of
West Virginia was a proper and necessary exercise of state power
to regulate a business.4 °
34. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 7E-1.02(3); CODE MD. REG. R. 09.10.01.25(B)(7); W.
VA. ADMIN. REG. R. 469.
35. 189. P.2d 17, 20 (Cal.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. Based on a four percent tax, the revenue to the California Horse Racing Board
was $16,563,763.36 for the fiscal year 1945-46. Id.
39. State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d 263, 274 (W. Va.
1949).
40. Id. The rule provided:
The saliva of the winner of each and every race shall be taken, and from such
other horses as the Stewards may direct. In all such cases the trainer shall be held
responsible for the condition of his horse or horses, except in case of unavoidable
absence of the trainer, when the stable foreman or groom in charge of the horse or
horses shall be held responsible, and in the event of the horse or horses from
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Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in O'Daniel v. Ohio State
Racing Commission"1 determined that horse racing was an area
subject to extensive regulation and that strict liability could prop-
erly be imposed. The Ohio court cited Sandstrom for the proposi-
tion that no irrebuttable presumption was created by the Rules of
Racing adopted by the Ohio State Racing Commission."2 Since lia-
bility was not based upon the actual drugging of a horse or the
failure to exercise proper care while protecting a horse, a presump-
tion of either of these two occurrences would not affect the
trainer's case. The court reasoned that the trainer is an insurer and
therefore liable if a horse is drugged, regardless of who adminis-
tered the drug.'" Another Ohio court stated that the seemingly
harsh rule which imposed strict liability on trainers was not unrea-
sonable in light of three factors: (1) the rule's purpose, (2) the bus-
iness the rule helped regulate, and (3) the evil that could arise if
such rules were not implemented. 4 If applied to Florida, a consid-
eration of these factors would seem to indicate that Florida's rules
(15) and (16) are similarly reasonable.
In Sanderson v. New Mexico State Racing Commission,4 the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that strict liability could be im-
posed as a condition to the granting of a license to a horse trainer.
To obtain the license, a trainer had to agree to abide by all the
rules and regulations of his profession.4" The New Mexico court
later held in Jamison v. State Racing Commission41 that the in-
tent to drug or the knowledge of a drugging by the trainer was not
needed to impose liability on the trainer. The rule in New Mexico
requires the trainer to be strictly accountable for the condition of a
which said saliva has been taken shall have been found by the Chemist to show
evidence of the administration of narcotics, said responsible person so offending
shall be suspended for not less than six (6) months and the case referred to the
West Virginia Racing Commission for any further action deemed necessary.
Id. at 265-66.
41. 307 N.E.2d 529, 532-33 (Ohio 1974).
42. Id. at 531-32.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 210 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965). This
court ruled that the absence of an intent requirement does not render an absolute insurer
rule unconstitutional. Id.
45. 453 P.2d 370, 372 (N.M. 1969). Unlike Baldwin, the Sanderson court clearly stated
that a license carried no vested property rights, and therefore, that a license is not a right
protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Id. If the license
is not protected by the due process clause, then the imposition of strict liability cannot
deprive the horse trainer of any constitutional right which relates to the due process clause.
46. Id. at 372.
47. 507 P.2d 426, 428 (N.M. 1973).
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horse entered in a race; thus, the trainer is liable merely because
he has entered a drugged horse in a race regardless of whether the
trainer has knowledge of the horse's condition.48
Maryland's position with respect to the constitutionality of abso-
lute insurer rules appears to be changing. After the Mahoney deci-
sion (cited by Baldwin as persuasive precedent), the Maryland
Racing Commission promulgated a rule which imposed an absolute
duty on trainers to guard their horses.49 In Maryland Racing Com-
mission v. McGee,50 the Maryland Court of Appeals went to great
lengths in dictum to report that the absolute insurer rules of other
jurisdictions did not violate the constitutional rights of trainers.
While refusing to rule on the more precise question of whether
trainers could constitutionally be held guilty if they had taken all
possible measures to ensure the safety of their horses, the court
stated that there was no need for the presentation of evidence
which indicated that the trainer himself had drugged the horse. 1
The court affirmed the revocation of the trainer's license in light of
evidence which indicated only that the trainer did not take all pos-
sible precautions.52 Since this case may indicate that Maryland is
modifying its strict liability rule, the opinion arguably implies that
if the trainer had taken all possible precautions for the horse's
safety, he would not be held liable a.5
In comparison to the acceptance of absolute insurer rules in the
majority of states, there is one state that continues to hold abso-
lute insurer rules unconstitutional. As rationale for its stance, in
Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board,54 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that a strict liability rule would accomplish no more than a
48. Id.
49. Rule 111 provided that:
No person shall administer, or cause or knowingly permit to be administered, or
connive at the administration of, any drug to any horse entered for a race. Every
owner, trainer, or groom must guard, or cause to be guarded, each horse owned,
trained or attended by him in such manner as to prevent any person or persons
from administering to the horse, by any method, any drug prior to the time of the
start of the race which is of such character as to affect the racing condition of the
horse.
Maryland Racing Comm'n v. McGee, 128 A.2d 419, 420 (Md. 1957) (current version of rule
111 at CODE MD. REG. R. 09.10.01.11(D)).
50. 128 A.2d 419, 423-24 (Md. 1957).
51. Id. at 424-25.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 247 N.E.2d 881, 884 (Ill. 1969). The court stated that "it is a fundamental principle
of Anglo-Saxon justice that responsibility is personal and that penalties may not be inflicted
on one person because of another's acts."Id, at 883.
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rule based on fault because under both types of rules, a trainer
would be motivated to protect his horses.
In addition to these state courts, federal circuit courts of appeal
have recognized and approved the absolute insurer rule. The
Fourth Circuit held that an absolute insurer rule deters the drug-
ging of horses and induces trainers to provide better care for their
horses. 5 Absolute insurer rules protect both the health of the
horse and the horse racing industry and therefore, the court con-
cluded, such insurer rules are reasonable and do not violate proce-
dural due process."
The Seventh Circuit concluded that an Illinois regulation, which
mandated that the prize money be withheld from the owner of the
drugged winner and redistributed among the owners of the other
horses in the race, did not violate the drugged racehorse owner's
right to procedural due process despite the absence of a determina-
tion of fault.5 7 The court noted that this punishment was not as
harsh as would be the suspension of a trainer's license. 8 Despite
the existence of an irrebuttable presumption, the court held that
the rule was constitutional in that it was not based upon "an arbi-
trary, irrational or unreasonable standard."'
The ability to impose strict liability on horse trainers is within
the powers of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering as the Florida
legislature has given the Division the broad power to promulgate
the rules and regulations which govern horse racing. 0 This imposi-
tion of strict liability for horse trainers is reasonable due to several
factors. First, the health of the horses needs to be protected. Sec-
55. Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 244.
57. Edelberg v. Illinois Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 284.
59. Id. at 286.
60. See FLA. STAT. § 550.02 (1979) which provides in pertinent part:
The Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering of the Department of Business Regulation
shall carry out the provisions of this chapter .... Make rules and regulations for
the control, supervision and direction of all applicants, permitees and licensees,
and for the holding, conducting and operating of all racetracks, race meets, races
held in this state . . . may take testimony concerning any matter within its juris-
diction and issue summons and subpoenas for any witness .
Id. at .02, .02(3).
In addition to the horse racing industry, Florida has utilized strict liability rules in other
areas. See FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1979) which provides that dog owners should be liable for
damages for persons bitten. See also Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358
So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1978) (only available defenses to dog owner are those expressed in the stat-
ute); Issacs v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (owner of a wild animal is
strictly liable for injuries inflicted by it).
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ond, the government of Florida acquires a pecuniary benefit from
maintenance of public confidence in the sport. Since the Florida
pari-mutuel industry is a significant source of tax dollars, it should
be well guarded to ensure the continuation of these revenues.61
Third, the state should protect the interests of the innocent bet-
ting public."2 And finally, as one case stated, "[h]orse racing, at its
best, is difficult to control, and would be practically impossible to
regulate if every governing rule and regulation was made depen-
dent for validity upon the knowledge or motives of the person
charged with a violation."s Viewed as a whole, these factors pre-
sent valid justifications for a strict liability rule. 4
Despite the lack of a mens rea requirement, Florida's absolute
insurer rules give the accused a fair opportunity to disprove the
charges brought against him. When the investigator from the Divi-
sion of Pari-Mutuel Wagering cited Caple for violation of rules
(15) and (16), the Division did not suspend Caple's license until a
formal hearing was held before the stewards.65 Chapter 120, Flor-
ida Statutes,66 allows a defendant to appeal a steward's ruling to
61. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. In the fiscal year 1976-77, thoroughbred horse racing
was the source of over twenty-one million dollars in tax revenue for Florida. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 210 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
64. Due to the similarities between criminal laws and regulations such as rules (15) and
(16), an examination of the liability concept as related to criminal law will be informative.
In his text on criminal law, Professor LeFave suggests six areas that should be examined to
determine if a strict liability rule can be imposed without violating due process require-
ments. LaFave suggests that those persons who develop and apply the rule should investi-
gate several factors: the reason for the law; the reasonableness of requiring people to comply
with it; the stigma associated with conviction; the severity of the penalty; whether the regu-
lation is based on common law; and whether the legislature intended that there be a specific
mens rea requirement. W. LAFAvE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 133-35, 138-39 (1978). Of these
criteria, two in particular may militate against applying the doctrine in the Caple situation.
First, the penalty imposed on a trainer might seem to be too severe. To prohibit a trainer
from practicing his profession for sixty days or more may appear overly stringent when
compared to the possible imposition of a small fine. But compare Caple with United States
v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975), where the defendant was convicted of attempting to
board an airplane while possessing a dangerous, concealed weapon. The court held that
since the statutory penalty, a maximum fine of $1000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both, was relatively minor, no reason existed to prevent the imposition of strict
liability. Id. at 43. According to the Flum rationale, Caple's suspension cannot be considered
overly harsh.
Second, the potential stigma attached to Caple's suspension may argue against imposition
of a strict liability rule. Caple's good name could be associated with the drugging of horses
which would thereby hinder his employment opportunities by destroying his reputation as
an ethical trainer. It is questionable, however, whether this potential stigma would be suffi-
cient to prevent the use of strict liability rules.
65. 362 So. 2d at 1352.
66. (1979). Procedures are laid out in FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)-(2) (1979).
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both the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering and the Department of
Business Regulation. Caple pursued both courses of review. Also,
judicial review is available after the hearing by the Department.6 7
Since the standard is strict liability, the defendant's available
defenses are severely limited. The Baldwin court noted that there
were only three defenses available to a trainer: (1) that the test
indicating the presence of a forbidden drug was faulty, (2) that the
person charged was not the trainer, or (3) that the alleged drugged
horse had not been entered in a race." The Caple court added an-
other defense by stating that in cases involving acts completely be-
yond the control of the trainer, no punishment will be adminis-
tered. 9 For example, a trainer would not be punished for having
drugs in an unlocked cabinet if there was evidence that someone
had forcefully entered the trainer's barn and removed the lock
from the cabinet. In this instance, the trainer would technically
have violated the regulation in that the cabinet containing drugs
was no longer locked, but the Caple court stated that under such
conditions, it would obviously be inequitable to punish the
trainer. 70
In summary, it should be noted that the Caple court concluded
that an absolute insurer rule as stated in rules (15) and (16) is rea-
sonable in "light of its overall purpose, the business to which it
relates, and the potential evil which it is designed to prevent."7 1
The court in Caple used the sound reasoning of other jurisdictions
to support a ruling that encompasses slightly more than the rulings
in these other jurisdictions. In addition to the consideration of the
reasonableness of rules (15) and (16), Florida statutes provide a
trainer with an adequate opportunity to raise any defense. In light
of these circumstances, the burden placed on the Florida trainers
by a strict liability rule is justifiable.
CHUCK TALLEY
67. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1979).
68. 31 So. 2d at 630. In view of rules (15) and (16), the third possible defense is no longer
available, see note 2 supra.
69. 362 So. 2d at 1354, n.12.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1354 (quoting Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 210 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1965)).
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